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Appointing a Proxy Under the Best of Circumstances
PatriciaD. White*
We are commonly told that if we wish to ensure that our end
is not unduly prolonged by extraordinary medical treatment we
should either execute a living will or appoint someone to be our
proxy medical treatment decision maker. Estate planners, medical
personnel, and now even the federal government' encourage us to
choose a surrogate to act in our stead in case of our own incompetence. If we do this, it is said, we can avoid becoming a victim of
the debate about who should decide when to terminate an
incompetent patient's life support systems if the patient, when
competent, never articulated a preference nor appointed a proxy
decision maker.
The debate itself is an arresting one. It has all the elements
of high drama and forces us to wrestle with a set of moral
problems about which many feel strongly but which, like all such
problems, is probably irresoluble outside the context of a deeper
and pervasive moral theory. The debate becomes more urgent for
us, however, because the realities of modern medicine require that
it be resolved, at least as an issue of public policy. And if the
question of who should decide is not difficult enough, we also
struggle with the difficult question of what standard or standards
should guide the decision maker. Should the standard be the best
interest of the patient as conceived when the patient was competent; the best interest of the patient now; the best interest of the
decision maker; the best interest of the state; or is it the decision
which best approximates the decision which the patient-if
competent--would now make knowing what the decision maker
knows about the patient's present condition and prognosis? As this
highly-charged discussion evolves-and as the advice to appoint a
proxy decision maker is increasingly given-I am struck by how
little, systematic attention has been given to a set of issues which
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. See, e.g., Patient Self Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-115, 1388-204 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395cc, 1396a (West
1992)) (directing health care providers to advise patients of their rights under state law
to execute advance directives).
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is both conceptually prior to these questions and of great practical
significance. We have not stopped to look carefully at just what
possible choices competent people might make when they do in fact
appoint proxy medical decision makers. I have in mind a set of
issues different from the issues surrounding the content of the
patient's living will.2 This paper analyzes the choices available to
a competent person when appointing a proxy. My hope is that if
we can clarify these issues, we can begin to help people articulate
their own choices more clearly and have a more satisfactory
discussion of what is at stake in a setting where no decision maker
has been appointed for an incompetent patient.
A competent person might appoint a proxy decision maker at
a time when he was healthy or at a time when he was sick. It
seems probable that one's health at the time of appointing a proxy
decision maker could influence significantly what one intends by
the appointment. Even self-aware people find it difficult to predict
accurately how they would react to some hypothetical future crisis.
The perceived immediacy of appointing a proxy decision maker
would clearly make the choice made by a competent but extremely
ill person different from the choice made by the same person when
he enjoyed perfect health. But while it seems clear that a person's
health might well affect the intent of his proxy appointment, it is
not at all clear what that effect would be. For example, some
gravely ill people might be able to see and articulate their desires
more clearly than they could while healthy, while others might
find themselves less able to determine what they would want. This
lessened ability might in no way be indicative of incompetence;
rather, it might be a function of denial, fear, ambivalence, genuine
indecision, or some combination of these or other reactions to the
situation. Unfortunately, then, we have a problem with our
analysis at the outset because we cannot even say with confidence
that the last proxy executed by a competent person most accurately reflects his wishes. This comment may seem odd, since it might
appear that even a gravely ill competent patient who is in a state
of denying his likely imminent need for a proxy decision maker is
reflecting his latest thoughts on the subject when he appoints a
proxy a few days before lapsing into unconsciousness. But while
he is perhaps reflecting his latest thoughts on the subject he may

2. This is a distinct area which is not necessarily well thought out either.
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well not be reflecting his considered thoughts on the subject. Those
might have been reflected in a prior inconsistent proxy directive.
It might well be that had the patient remained competent and
gravely ill for a long enough time, he might have come to terms
with his situation and ratified his first proxy designation or
perhaps executed one altogether different from either of the other
two.
Putting these complications aside for the moment, assume
that a rational, healthy person is asked to think hard about
appointing a proxy medical decision maker. Assume, too, that this
person is not being asked to write a living will or indicate what
particular treatments he would like his proxy decision maker to
choose for him in particular circumstances.
There are at least three rather different sorts of situations in
which a person might find himself needing a proxy medical
decision maker. The obvious and much discussed case is the one
in which the patient is either unconscious or otherwise incompetent and is in quite dire straits, unlikely ever to recover. The
second is the circumstance where the patient is temporarily
unconscious or otherwise incompetent but is expected to recover
fully. Somewhere between these two extremes on the inevitable
continuum is the case where the unconscious or otherwise
incompetent patient might or might not recover. There are
important differences between these circumstances from the
perspective of a person thinking about appointing a surrogate
medical decision maker. Indeed, the rational person might well
look for different things from the decision maker appointed in each
of these three circumstances.
If, for example, one wanted to provide for the possibility that
unanticipated medical decisions might need to be made in
connection with ongoing surgery, during which she would be
unconscious but from which she was fully expected to recover,
some might request that the decision maker's standard be "the
patient's best interest," while others might require that the
decision maker adhere to a substituted judgment standard. These
two standards might be substantially different in this circumstance, and the person best suited to apply each standard might
be different. If, as hypothesized, full recovery were the likely
outcome, the patient might reasonably appoint her physician as
her proxy decision maker with the instruction that the doctor act
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in the patient's best interest. The patient in this situation would
likely want those medical choices made which would maximize her
chances for a medically optimal outcome. If a person had selected
a physician in whom she had confidence, she would presumably
have confidence in that physician's judgment throughout the
episode. On the other hand, the patient might hate pain or may be
particularly squeamish about gruesome-sounding procedures. Such
a person might not be able to count on herself to make those
medical decisions which are in her own best interest. We all know
people like this, and probably nearly all of us are more like this
than our rational selves care to admit. This is the person who puts
off going to the doctor when she has some disconcerting symptom.
This is the person who refuses to exercise when he is told that his
weight is dangerously high. This person cannot count on himself
to act in his own best interest when he is making his own medical
choices. If his proxy decision maker were instructed to use a
substituted judgment standard when making decisions for the
unconscious patient, and if that instruction and standard were
taken seriously, then the proxy might make choices that are not
in the patient's best interest.
If our competent person, seeking to appoint a proxy, wanted
someone who understood and would honor her aversions, she
would clearly choose someone other than her physician, presumably someone to whom she was very close. She would instruct her
proxy decision maker to make the same choices that she herself
would have made. In other words, the choice that the physician
would make might differ from the choice that the patient herself
would make. Although it might seem misleading to say that the
former decision is made in the patient's best interest while the
latter, the one the patient would have made, is not in the patient's
best interest, this is not necessarily true. People not only sometimes do act against their own best interest, but they sometimes
want to act against their own best interest. Wanting to act in a
particular way does not change the nature of the act into one
which is in the person's best interest. This is certainly true if the
best interest standard is thought to apply to the person's medical
condition and the substituted judgment standard is thought to
represent the choice which the patient himself would actually have
made had he been able to make it. So even in the simplest of
cases, the person seeking to appoint a medical decision proxy is
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faced with a nontrivial choice: Should he appoint someone who
will act in his best interest or should he appoint someone who will
act as he would act, in accordance with the substituted judgment
standard? Not only is he faced with choosing a standard but each
standard might suggest a different proxy.
Things become considerably more complicated as the nature
of the circumstance in which the proxy is to act changes. If you are
seeking to appoint a proxy to act as your surrogate in a circumstance where your recovery is so unlikely as to be essentially
impossible, there are other possible standards which you might
wish to have applied to the surrogate's decisions. Of course you
might request that the surrogate act in your own best interest or
act as you would. Alternatively, you might believe that except for
the management of your pain, you would no longer have a stake
in the details of your treatment, since its outcome is certain
ultimately to be death. You might therefore want to choose as a
surrogate someone who would have something at stake; perhaps
the person who would be financially responsible for your care, or
perhaps someone who would be emotionally affected by your
death. You might in fact want to choose as a surrogate the person
who had the most at stake in your treatment and instruct that
person to make decisions about your medical treatment in the
surrogate's best interest. This is not something that everyone
would wish to do, nor is it something that everyone ought to do,
but surely it is something that a reasonable proxy appointer might
do.
We have not yet exhausted the possibilities. As indicated
above, you might believe that you would no longer have a stake in
the outcome and that others would. However, instead of selecting
a proxy whose own stake is great, you might choose instead a
person whom you believe is best able to consider and weigh the
interests of everyone who has something at stake. This might lead
you to appoint someone who personally has little or nothing at
stake, but whose judgment you trust. Since, as I have described
this situation, this judgment would not primarily be medical, this
person might be some relatively neutral party, such as a clergyman or other close family advisor, a trusted friend, or a social
worker. Or you might choose someone who had something
significant at stake, but whom you nonetheless asked to give her
own interests only the weight they deserved in comparison with
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others' interests. Finally, you might want to instruct your surrogate to act as he wants to. You don't give him guidance, you don't
instruct him to act in his own best interest, and you don't instruct
him to act in the best interest of everyone with something at
stake. Presumably, the distinction between what the surrogate
wants and what is in the surrogate's best interest is as real as the
distinction between what you want and what is in your best
interest.
But the story does not end here. You might believe that you
would have an interest in the outcome, even if you were unconscious and without any prospect of recovery. You might believe
that your interest was only one of the interests to be considered,
or you might believe that your interest in the outcome was
paramount. If you believed that your interest was but one of the
relevant interests, you might want a surrogate who would weigh
all of the interests, including yours, in making choices on your
behalf. Once again, you might choose a neutral but trusted person
for this task. On the other hand, if you believed both that your
interest in the outcome of your treatment would not be extinguished until your death, and that your interest overrides all other
interests, you would select as a surrogate either a person who
would choose as you would choose or a person who would use your
best interest as his standard and whose understanding of what
constitutes your best interest is consistent with your own. If your
overriding interest is your life, you would probably choose a
different surrogate from the one you would choose if your overriding interest is "dying with dignity." And you might make still a
different choice if your primary concern is that you not burden
your family or loved ones. Ironically, if your primary concern were
the last one, you might instruct your surrogate to make choices on
the basis of what is in the best interest of everyone who would be
affected by the decision, other than you. You would do this
precisely because you would like to effectuate what you consider
to be your overriding interest.
The discussion so far has centered on healthy, competent
people trying to determine whom they would appoint as proxy
medical decision makers, first where unanticipated medical
decisions might need to be made during a period of temporary
unconsciousness or incompetence but where the patient's full
recovery is expected, and second in the radically different circum-
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stance where treatment decisions would need to be made for a
patient who is almost certainly not going to recover. Unfortunately, the need for a proxy decision maker is probably most likely to
arise in a situation which is more ambiguous than either of these
extremes.
The ambiguity often arises because it is difficult to predict
exactly what degree of recovery is likely. If it is difficult for a
physician to predict reliably the course of a critically ill patient's
treatment and recovery, it is even more difficult for a proxy
decision maker to apply his assigned standard for decision making.
If the decision maker has been instructed to act in the patient's
best interest, the decision maker is presented with an impossible
task, because the factual data necessary to determine the patient's
best interest are patently inadequate. If, as a rational, healthy
person, you wanted to appoint a surrogate medical decision maker
to act for you in this ambiguous circumstance, and if you wanted
the surrogate to act in your best interest, then you might place
more importance on the surrogate's ability to achieve a relatively
sophisticated understanding of your medical situation and
prognosis than you would in the situation,where your prognosis is
unambiguously bleak. This might, of course, argue for choosing
your physician as a proxy, but not necessarily. If you had wanted
the proxy to apply the substituted judgment standard, you might
have chosen a close friend or a relative in the earlier less ambiguous situations. Those same reasons apply here. You might want a
proxy who knows you and your values well enough to allow him
to make an informed judgment as to what is in your best interest.
The proxy's determination might still be different from the
determination you would make yourself, but your own ability to
deal with a life of diminished capacity is surely relevant to a
determination of your best interest. Whereas determining your
best interest when full recovery is clear seems to be largely a
medical judgment, and whereas determining your best interest
when failure to recover is clear seems to be largely a judgment
about you and your values, determining what is in your best
interest in the ambiguous situation seems to require a proxy who
can combine both judgments in making a much more complicated
determination. It is entirely plausible to imagine, therefore, that
a rational healthy person might select a different proxy for each

856

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[1992: 849

of the three circumstances, even though the standard governing
each proxy is the patient's best interest.
The judgment that the proxy is being asked to make is
correspondingly complicated if the rational, healthy proxy appointer selects any of the other possible standards. As indicated above,
a healthy appointer might select as a surrogate the family member
with the most at stake if the appointer were in a persistent
vegetative state with no hope of recovery, and might instruct that
proxy to act in the proxy's own best interest. Nonetheless, the
appointer could conceivably not want the proxy to be placed in the
position of determining the appointer's fate in a medically complex
or uncertain situation, even though the appointer wants the
standard for decisions to remain the best interest of the proxy. The
appointer might recognize that the required decisions could be so
complex that the proxy would simply not be the person best able
to make the determinations which would best protect the proxy's
own interests.
The medically ambiguous situation suggests yet another type
of proxy arrangement which might be selected by the rational
healthy person in anticipation of finding herself in this circumstance. She might believe that her own best interest should be
paramount until, and only until, the interests of others outweighed
it. This point could be reached when her level of probable recovery
were sufficiently low or when the burden on others of maintaining
her had become sufficiently high. At this point the proxy appointer
might want to shift proxies, shift standards to be applied by the
proxy, or both. Indeed, in medically ambiguous situations the
rational person might want to establish a mechanism whereby
someone is appointed whose sole job is to determine when this
point has been reached-mediating, as you will, between different
proxies, different standards, or both.
I have described the need for a proxy as falling on a continuum ranging from the patient's short-term need for a surrogate
decision maker during a period of temporary incompetence or
unconsciousness pending expected full recovery, to the situation
exemplified by the patient in the persistent vegetative state with
no hope of recovery. In anticipation of finding himself at some time
at some point along this continuum, the rational healthy person
might choose different proxies, different standards, or both for the
proxy to apply at various points on this continuum. As the
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preceding discussion indicates, the process of appointing a proxy
medical decision maker, if approached seriously, ought to be a far
more complicated one than current practice would suggest. The
standard forms of durable powers of attorney for health care
decisions do not begin to reflect anything of the subtlety which the
question they seek to answer demands.
A durable power of attorney for health care decisions is often
accompanied by a living will or advance directive. An advance
directive typically specifies the conditions under which the person
executing it would not wish to be kept alive by various, often
specified, forms of so-called heroic measures. It does not indicate
who is to make medical decisions on the patient's behalf, rather,
it purports to be a document whereby the patient makes his own
decisions with respect to a subset of potential future circumstances. This distinction is important because it underscores the very
great practical limitations which are built into the notion of the
living will. Whereas the impetus for honoring the instructions set
forth in an advance directive arises from the presumption that the
document expresses the patient's own wishes and thus represents
his autonomous choice, it is a choice which the patient has
necessarily made on the basis of incomplete information.
A living will is a very crude instrument to use for making
actual medical decisions. It is far more effective as a device that
allows a person to make known his attitude about a whole range
of issues surrounding medical intervention at or near the end of
life. A living will is best viewed as setting forth standards for
decision making which should be taken into account by whoever
actually makes the decisions governing the incompetent patient's
medical care. The reason that an advance directive, under normal
circumstances, should only be regarded as advisory rather than
determinative is that all it can express is what a competent person
thought she would want were she to become incompetent and be
in a situation generically like the one she turns out actually to be
in. This kind of preference expression is clearly different from the
sort of informed consent that we require of competeni patients
before undertaking medically significant procedures or treatment.
The difference suggests why it is a mistake to conceive of an
advance directive as expressing an incompetent patient's autonomous choice in any specific circumstance. We need not doubt that
the patient really meant what she said nor that what she said
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reflected her attitudes and values. But we must acknowledge that,
typically at least, the patient did not in her advance directive
address the precise question which needs to be answered; namely,
how, at this time and in these particular circumstances, she
should be treated. Thus while we might wish to argue that respect
for a patient's autonomy requires paying attention to the values
and attitudes expressed in his advance directive, it does not make
sense to justify relying on the instructions in an advance directive
on the grounds that they express the patient's decision about
particular medical treatment.
It is worth looking briefly at the case of the advance directive
or living will because the same observation can be made about a
competent person's appointment of a proxy medical decision
maker. The assumption behind honoring such an appointment at
the time of a patient's incompetence is that the appointment
represents the patient's wishes, and we justify honoring his wishes
by suggesting that they represent his autonomous choice. But to
the extent that we have reasonable doubt about what his actual
wishes were, then we seem less bound to try to honor them. My
analysis of the considerations that a well-thought-out proxy
appointment might entail suggests that in most cases where a
medical treatment decision proxy has been appointed, the
appointing person will either not have been asked or not adequately focused upon the questions that he needs to answer in order to
know what he really wants. If he did not answer the right
questions then it is difficult to justify honoring what he said on
grounds of autonomy. As a practical matter, our efforts as lawyers,
philosophers, and physicians should be directed at helping proxy
appointers frame the questions whose answers are necessary to
gain a proper understanding of the appointer's intentions. The
analysis of this paper is intended as a first step toward that goal.
In the absence of sufficiently helpful directions from a
competent person about who should speak for him during his
incompetence and in accordance with what standard, we need a
default decision maker or proxy. Typically, of course, physicians
and nurses consult with a patient's family and try to reach a
consensus about how best to act. In the vast majority of cases this
sort of consultative procedure works well. But problems inevitably
arise when there is dissension between the doctors and the family,
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among the family members, or when, as in the Cruzan' case, the
hospital administration seeks judicial approval of its action in
order to protect itself from legal liability for a decision which could
be construed as hastening a patients death. This default mechanism could take various forms. It could either create a presumption in favor of a decision maker or process by which decisions will
be made, or it could presume that certain standards will govern all
medical decisions. Thus, for example, the default position might
favor maintaining a patient's life at whatever cost and at whatever
diminished capacity.4 On the other hand, it could presume a
decision maker rather than a result. For example, the presumption
could specify certain family members in some order of preference.'
Mistakes would doubtlessly be made under any presumption-at least if the standard for determining what constitutes a
mistake is what that patient would have done when competent
were he to observe his own plight as an incompetent patient.
Although it is difficult really to argue for this view, my own sense
is that more mistakes would probably be made if a result were
presumed than would be made if the presumption were instead in
favor of family decision makers. The available data seems to
indicate that most people would not prefer life at all costs,
although some would.' An overriding principle in favor of prolonging life, therefore, would clearly result in some lives being
extended in ways the patients,themselves would not have chosen.

3. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1990).
4. Yale Kamisar takes something close to this view. He argues that to allow others
to weigh the costs and benefits of the patient's existence is to embark on a very
dangerous slippery slope. See Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional"Rightto
Die"? When Is There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203, 1203
(1991); Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation,42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1030-41 (1958). This was also the effect of the position
adopted by Missouri and its Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,42427 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,
2845 (1990).
5. Nancy Rhoden argued that there should be a presumption in favor of families as
decision makers. Nancy K Rhoden, LitigatingLife and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375,
390-94 (1988). Several states have statutes which specify an ordered list of family
members as surrogate decision makers. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105(2)(b)
(Supp. 1992).
6. One small study found that elderly patients have both an expectation of and a
preference for familial decision making in the event of their future inability to make
their own medical decisions. Dallas M. High, All in the Family: Extended Autonomy and
Expectations in SurrogateHealth Care Decision-Making, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 46, 48-49
(Supp. 1988).
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Although it is hard to conceive that a court would articulate an
overriding principle in favor of removing life support systems, such
a principle would certainly yield a result different from what
people like Helga Wanglie 7 would choose. By contrast, a presumption in favor of a specified family decision maker would at least
allow for the possibility that different decisions would be made for
different patients, and thus acknowledge the fact that people's
preferences, as expressed when they are competent, differ.
A thorough analysis of potential default mechanisms would
be a complex and difficult undertaking. Such an undertaking is
not the project of this paper. The point here is to begin an analysis
which properly precedes the choice of a default mechanism. Until
we understand the range of choices which a healthy competent
person might rationally make when appointing a proxy for medical
decisions, we cannot make much progress helping others to
articulate their choices. The Patient Self Determination Act seeks
to increase the use of advance directives and proxy appointments
by hospital patients. This goal reflects a sense that these documents reliably represent a person's wishes. My analysis, however,
suggests that the typical proxy appointer will not have been asked
or have focused on the questions whose answers are necessary for
this to be true. There is real work to be done.

7. See In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991). For a discussion
of the Wanglie decision, see Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox and Pandora'sBox: The
Tragedy of CurrentRight-to-Die Jurisprudence25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 133 (1991).
8. Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115, 1388-204 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395cc, 1396a (West 1992)). For a brief discussion of the Act's
rationale see Elizabeth McCloskey, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The Patient SelfDeterminationAct, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 80 (1991).

